Self-employed time declarations and potential hour credits

Another use for potential hour credits is for those who are self-employed. This could be very useful as accounting hour credits for the self-employed is one of the biggest challenges for hourly averaging.

There are two areas in which potential hour credits can be useful for self-employed individuals and start-up enterprises. The first is similar to the proposal for creative activities while the second applies to longer established self-employed individuals who are doing relatively poorly compared to their previous income and that of others in their field.

Those starting an enterprise could be given the option of registering a certain number of potential hour credits for their activities up until the point where they receive outside investment or generate revenue. There would again be a maximum number of hour credits of this kind that people could claim in a given period, of—say—five per person per week. They would also have to provide some evidence or at least a detailed description of their activities. If the business later became successful the potential hour credits could be upgraded to real ones.

The second area in which potential hour credits could be useful is linked to the above proposal. However, it would apply to small businesses which have been worthy of hour credits in the past but are doing relatively poorly in the marketplace. Since sales are taken as a sign of activity there would be a strong reason for the authorities to limit the hour credits received by businesses which suffer a drop in revenue. However, the drop in revenue may occur for legitimate reasons such as time spent building a new client base, developing new skills or developing a new product.

If people are not able to receive hour credits for the above activities then it would give smaller businesses a disadvantage over larger ones which may not have their revenues scrutinised so closely. The self-employed and very small businesses would be closely scrutinised due to their greater potential for hour credit fraud. It would be possible to utilise market discipline in order to provide the self-employed with an incentive to work hard for their hour credits by limiting hour credit powers only to those who do sufficiently well in their industry.

Small businesses and self-employed contractors could be split into types and their revenues could be compared to those of the same type. Those who drop below their previous levels of income or who are below the average could have their self-validated hour credit powers revoked. However, the potential hour credit approach allows much greater flexibility in the treatment of such businesses.

It would be possible to apply rules which would only allow self-employed workers to claim the maximum amount of hour credits if they earn more than the mid-point between the median and mean revenue for a business of the type in question. Those who fall below could receive a proportion of their claimed credits as only potential hour credits. For example, someone might receive 140 hour credits for the month and a further 30 potential hour credits (to add up to whatever the maximum is for the month in question, assuming that they claim the maximum). If their business later exceeds the average level they could convert these past hour credits into full ones.

Using potential hour credits in this way would avoid the alternative binary approach whereby people either obtain the hour credits they claim or are refused them. This binary approach might be overly generous to some while over punitive of others whose business might have temporarily low revenue.

Furthermore, these businesses could even claim some of their activities as potential hour credits where they involve activities that do not immediately generate revenue such as retraining. This would make it simpler for them to claim the hour credits for their billable activity while still getting some (potential) credit for their other activities.

Using potential hour credits as part of the process for very small businesses—particularly the self-employed and start-up enterprises—would add valuable flexibility into the hourly averaging system. This would enable greater use of market discipline while reducing the risk of penalising self-employed workers who have a temporary drop in fortune. 

Potential hour credits and creative activity

When describing the usefulness of potential hour credits I used the example of a writer. Indeed, it is with artistic works that the benefits of the proposal are most obvious. Few artists are fortunate enough to receive paid commissions or advances to develop their works; people give large amounts of their time and effort to such endeavours. This could include music, poetry, novels, short stories, dramatic works, paintings and sculpture.

Most artists would no doubt like to make a living from their artistic works and hope that if they produce works then these will enable them to develop a career as a paid artist. Alternatively, the works they produce without any outside support might later prove to be valuable. If artists have no way to obtain hour credits for this activity then in an hour credit society it would be much more expensive (in opportunity costs) for people to engage in creative activity: if it does pay off then the proceeds will be taxed at a relatively high rate.

Potential hour credits would enable people working on these to register the time they spend (up to a limit each week) on their creations. It may be sensible to ask them to provide evidence of the work on which they are engaged, such as descriptions, photos or samples of work in progress. Perhaps receipts from time spent in a recording studio would be another example of proof that would make claims for potential hour credits more likely to be successful.

Another form of creative activity that could be accounted using the same system would be individual inventors who are working on their own without any outside investment. They could provide information about the project and register potential hour credits in this way. Again, if the resultant patents or companies become successful then these potential hour credits can be converted.

Live performances would presumably only count as hour-credit worthy if they are paid and so would not count for potential credits. However, a more expansive option would be to take account of practice time and unpaid performances for artists, performers and musicians (up to a maximum of something like 4 or 5 hours per week). These could be drawn upon if the performers later make money from their performances.

Inventors or artists who work with the support of a larger institution or company would not need potential hour credits—they would receive these from their institution. However, those who create items on their own would be ideal candidates for potential hour credits which could be upgraded at a later date to fully-fledged ones. Registering works-in-progress could also be very useful in dealing with Copyright and patent disputes. (It would raise the question whether potential hour credits could be upgraded after the creator has died. I will not discuss this here, but would be inclined to say they should not).

Potential hour credits could help reduce the greater disparity that would otherwise arise between supported and unsupported artists and inventors. Since those with talents and good ideas sometimes receive recognition very late it may be sensible to provide some encouragement by allowing them to register their activities. 

What are potential hour credits?

Hour credits are highly valuable in an hourly averaging economy. Their distribution would need to be tightly controlled and the rules for entitlement to them would need to be strictly applied. The binary nature of hour credits could be seen as a source of great inflexibility in the system. In some cases the choice to give out hour credits for certain activities could be a very difficult one. Disallowing hour credits for an activity might stifle a highly useful and important part of the economy or society. Allowing them, on the other hand, may have serious consequences.

Consider the example of hour credits for writers. If writers are not able to claim hour credits this would reduce writing to a hobby activity, one which would need to be funded largely by people working on other activities. Great writers might have to waste valuable writing time doing approved work and society would miss out on many if not all of their latent works. Now consider the other extreme, where writers are given hour credits for spending time writing. If anyone is able to declare that they are writing something then many more people would than the number who would be considered serious writers. Free-riders could occasionally hand in a load of nonsense to justify the valuable hour credits (and the money that follows) they receive from society. Plus we wouldn’t want government approved censors making the call about which works were artistically valuable. The two extremes are undesirable.

My proposal is that people should be able to register ‘potential hour credits’ for some activities, for example that of unfunded writing explained above. These potential hour credits would not generate any tax or income benefits when they are granted. If the activities later generate income then the authorities can upgrade these potential hour credits into fully fledged ones. This could be applied at a rate of converting one hour credit for an amount earned above the zero-tax point. So if this amount is set at twice the zero-tax point and this point is £9 per hour then the potential hour credit upgrade rate would be one hour credit for every £18 earned from the activity. Once the income from the activity exceeds the number of potential hour credits there are no more to convert. Of course the taxpayer can continue to receive further income but this will have no further effect on hour credits.

A further suggestion (from my very clever fiancée Katy) is that the upgrade of potential hour credits could be accompanied by a tax-free top up payment as well. This would represent the difference in the value of an hour credit of the required value being received at the time the potential hour credit was granted and the time at which the potential hour credit was upgraded. Katy suggested using the ‘social time and preference rate.’ For the most part the payment would be very small. However, where the rate is high or the time-span is long the payment could be valuable to the recipient.

This briefly explains potential hour credits. Let me know in the comments if anything is left unclear. In the following posts I will explain the sorts of activities that would qualify, and also present another possible use for potential hour credits for self-employed workers. 

Missing from Rethinking Taxation: Potential Hour Credits

In my previous blog I mentioned some of the references that came too late to add to my book, Rethinking Taxation. However, there was another aspect of my hourly averaging proposal that I decided not to mention at all in order to save space and thereby keep the cost of the book down.

The proposal is for an additional method of receiving hour credits. As well as granting hour credits the authorities could have the power to grant potential hour credits, which could later be upgraded to full hour credits.

Potential hour credits add greater flexibility into the hourly averaging system. They can help to make the system fairer, more encouraging of innovation, and reduce the scope for fraud. This anticipates some of the concerns that critics might have about hourly averaging.

In the following blogs I will say more about:

1.       How potential hour credits work.

2.       Potential hour credits for works of art and inventions.

3.       Potential hour credits and start-up businesses.

4.       The way that potential hour credits can be used as part of the provision of hour credits to the self-employed. 

Missing references from Rethinking Taxation

My previous blog contained a list of references for my forthcoming book, Rethinking Taxation: An introduction to hourly averaging.

In common with works of art, you have to draw a line under a book at some point in time even though there are small things you might like to add. To be fair to the publisher, and to ensure that the book can come out sooner rather than later, I thought I could save the following additions for any future additions rather than delay any further. After all, additions would change all the pages and make it necessary to change the index etc..

Furthermore, nowadays it is easy enough to write a blog such as this one adding the latest information.

The first reference I would have liked to add would be to Thomas Piketty’s recent bestselling book ‘Capital in the 21st Century.’ Piketty had added further evidence to the argument that capitalism without redistributive taxation will always tend to generate widening inequality between capital-owners and workers. I pretty much assumed this to be the case throughout, since commonsensically those who have money behind them can invest, purchase things without the need to make debt repayments, and have the opportunity to earn as much as the poor from work while they obtain returns on capital.

The argument in the book does not depend on there being this tendency within capitalism, as there would be reasons to redistribute from free-market outcomes even if a higher proportion of less economically fortunate people who could catch up with the rich without redistribution. However, perhaps the point given greater validity by Piketty makes the case for redistribution even more urgent. This is because free-market economies will simply create an increasing division between “haves” and “have-nots” no matter what any individual does.

The other references I would particularly like to have added are to my own recent and future publications. I would add the following journal paper to footnote 109 on my approach to international taxation:

Bamford, Douglas. 'Realising International Justice: To Constrain or to Counter-Incentivise?', Moral Philosophy and Politics, 1/1 (2014), 127–46.

I would add the following journal article to footnote 4 on Dworkin's hypothetical insurance approach:

Bamford, Douglas. 'The Holistic and Policy Focused Interpretation of Hypothetical Insurance', Moral Philosophy and Politics, (forthcoming).

I also hope to have further publications confirmed in the near future which will develop some of the points I make in the book in greater detail. I hope to add these to this list as and when the titles and publication details etc. are confirmed.

I am sure many future publications will be relevant to the book, but I thought these ones were particularly noteworthy as I was considering adding them when doing the final proof. They were so close to inclusion!

References for Rethinking Taxation: an introduction to hourly averaging by Douglas Bamford

Including references in the book would have increased the size and therefore cost of it. I therefore promised to put these on my blog and here they are.

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Wordcloud of Rethinking Taxation

I quite like wordclouds, so I've made one for my forthcoming book, rethinking taxation:

Enjoy.