Book Review: Political Philosophy and Taxation

I was pleased to be asked to review a book on Political Philosophy and Taxation for the British Tax Review, and I wanted to provide the text here on my blog for the benefit of those who do not have access to the journal. 

Legal disclaimer: This material is (a slightly edited version of) the review first published by Thomson Reuters, trading as Sweet & Maxwell, 5 Canada Square, Canary Wharf, London, E14 5AQ. It was published in the British Tax Review as "Political Philosophy and Taxation (Springer, 2022), by Robert van Brederode (ed.) (2022, 5, pp662-5)" and is reproduced by agreement with the publishers. 

Review of Political Philosophy and Taxation, by Robert van Brederode (ed.) (Springer, 2022)

As someone who teaches an introductory course on political philosophy, I was pleased to be asked to review this work,  which really is—as it claims—the first book providing a comprehensive overview of political philosophy and taxation. The textbook for the course I teach (Wolff, 2015) begins with the suggestion that political philosophy might be about “Who gets what?” and “Says who?”  Put like this, the link between political philosophy and taxation is abundantly clear. 

There are, no doubt, many ways to structure such a book. It could be organised by topic like the abovementioned textbook, which covers the key topics of:

1) The nature and justification of the state.

2) Who should rule? Should we have democracy, and if so what kind?

3) Liberty and rights.

4) The distribution of property.

5) Justice for everyone, everywhere? (On whether Western political philosophy has ignored or excluded any important groups or perspectives.) 

Again, all of these topics are relevant to taxation, particularly property and distributive justice. However, unlike the above textbook, this book is organised around different schools of thought within the Western tradition. The subtitle of the book describes it as a history of political philosophy. The book does indeed provide a detailed intellectual history of several influential schools of (Western) thought on the topic, explaining how key thinkers from those schools approached the topic of taxation, situated within their wider philosophical projects. This is a sensible move. Experts in different schools of thought can then take turns in summarising each, indicating where key thinkers have said anything relating to taxation. 

One question this raises is whether the book is an exercise in intellectual history or directly one of the philosophies and their implications. The first and last chapters by the book’s editor are certainly not intellectual history, but rather direct interventions in debates. The other chapters tended to fit the historical brief more closely, reporting on the relations between various thinkers and their views of taxation.  Two, acknowledged, exceptions were Chapter 8 on legal positivism and the final chapter (11) where the editor provides his own proposal for radical tax reform. There is a good case for organising the book by historical school, though that places additional pressure on the introductory chapter, a point to which I will return. 

Interestingly, most of the authors are not obviously primarily political philosophers, given their departmental affiliations. However, they all clearly know their respective schools of thought very well indeed, often because they use them in their own research on taxation. Certainly, taxation is inevitably a multidisciplinary topic, hence the need for all who write about it to have a good understanding of political philosophy. 

Which “schools of thought” should be included in such a book? The book contains a lot of the ones I would expect, but I found some of the choices surprising. One thing to make readers aware of is that the book leans libertarian, which is clearly the editor’s own approach given the chapters he has authored (the first and last). Perhaps that is a perk of being the editor, but I think it should have been made clearer at the outset, or, perhaps even better to avoid these strong interventions given that they did not fit with the stated brief of the book. 

There are several chapters that are more left-leaning (on socialism, egalitarianism and feminism), so the book still provides a good overview of most of the relevant views of taxation. However, questions can be raised as to whether there was a need for chapters on conservatism, classical liberalism and libertarianism, plus the two non-historical chapters, given the overlap between them. 

I think that the libertarian leanings of the book could give a false impression of the way that contemporary political philosophers would approach taxation. I undertook a poll of 78 philosophers on the topic and one third approached the topic in a liberal egalitarian way (including myself). Thirty per cent took a socialist approach and about 15 per cent consequentialist, most of whom selected “centrist or progressive” rather than classical liberal.  Seventy per cent of responses indicated that liberal egalitarianism represented the dominant approach. A lot of the debates within this school were mentioned in the introduction but not actually presented in the book (except in passing). (For more on the literature see Pedersen) 

There would have been a case for a chapter on luck egalitarianism, and indeed Ronald Dworkin (2006) has an entire chapter on tax justice in a book which was not referenced at all.  

Another omission I thought was discussion of Aristotelian-inspired views (perhaps other than in the chapter on conservativism), which are particularly to be found in theories of desert, participatory democracy and communitarianism. Natural desert is a distributive theory, a rival to Nozickean libertarianism, utilitarianism and the various forms of egalitarianism (see Campbell, Miller). Desert theory is not at all popular with political philosophers—it had no advocates in my poll.  However, there is an argument that desert is the common approach of the public (see Shiffrin).  There was a section on desert in the introduction, but this was a very misleading discussion, presented as an attack on luck egalitarianism, a view which is neither desertist nor—we recall—represented in the book. 

Desert might also be relevant to those who believe that political decisions should be made democratically as a representation of the views of the common good, or as an expression of their views or values. Communitarianism was mentioned as an example of a view opposed to libertarianism in the introduction  but not again in the book. The final chapter did have “Democracy” in the title, but this did not present a history of the arguments for and against democracy, which go back to Plato’s Republic, but was in fact highly opposed to democracy. Agreeing with anti-democratic libertarians that “an electorate that is uninformed, underinformed, or misinformed”  will mean that majority rule “opens the door for the misuse of power to the detriment to the interests of others”.  “Majority democracy violates the principle of equality as it is based on coercion of the many”,  which apparently means that a decision by the majority to impose taxation would violate the “principle of liberty”.  These apparently inviolable principles are neither explained nor referenced.

Philosophy of colonialisation and race is another possible approach that could have been included, though this has methodological affinities with feminism and intersectionality as mentioned in the chapter on feminism. The historical-school approach taken also creates the problem that important contemporary debates are omitted, about global justice for instance. 

Most of my criticisms are of the introduction, as I’ve hinted above, which represents a missed opportunity. The first words of the introduction are “liberal individualism” but what is this and why start with it? Perhaps because methodological individualism was the starting point of Hobbes’ political thought, which later begat liberalism (though Hobbes was no liberal). If the book is written for newcomers to political philosophy it should have explained what that subject is, perhaps mentioning disagreements over method, such as whether liberal individualism is the right approach. Another important thing to cover is to explain the philosophical topics and disputes that bear on taxation, and perhaps to explain some common terminology. These are mentioned, but too obliquely for the complete novice who knows little about the subject. 

The introduction is very long, but far too much of it is spent attacking views that will be presented later in the book. There are seven pages criticising Murphy and Nagel (2002) on “everyday libertarianism,” even though their argument is presented in three pages near the end of Chapter 9 (pp.335–338).  I can understand that their arguments should be presented, since they are very important. However, the introductory chapter should really ease newcomers into the discipline, not simply attack the dominant views. 

The introduction began and ended with a key point that I would expect to find; why have a book on political philosophy and taxation? Some good points were made here, but more could have been added. The book is quite advanced, but it should be useful for graduate students and academics whose work relates to taxation. Tax practitioners may also benefit from considering political philosophy, though they might need to read an introductory text first. However, political philosophers too could be interested in reviewing what different schools of thought have to say about taxation. Those looking to write about tax will also benefit from having the dispersed writings of thinkers compiled together in one volume. 

Overall, as a political philosopher with a focus on taxation, there was little difficulty in selling the importance of a book with the title Political Philosophy and Taxation on me. The chapters were capably written by experts, and I learned a lot from it. Indeed, I found myself wishing that this very useful resource was available when I began my PhD on the topic nearly 15 years ago. 

References:

Campbell, T. (2002). Justice. Palgrave.

Dworkin, R. (2006). Is Democracy Possible Here? Princeton University Press.

Miller, D. (1999). Principles of social justice. Harvard University Press.

Murphy, L., & Nagel, T. (2002). The Myth of Ownership: Taxes and Justice. OUP.

Pedersen, J. (2020). Distributive justice and taxation. Routledge.

Sheffrin, S. M. (2013). Tax fairness and folk justice. Cambridge University Press.

Wolff, J. (2015). An introduction to political philosophy. OUP. 

Equality of Opportunity and Discrimination Materials

This coming term I will be teaching a new course for the general public on some overlapping issues relating to justice that I thought would work well together. 

The online course Equality of Opportunity and the Ethics of Discrimination covers some lingering issues of controversy about how society should respond to unequal opportunity. There is even disagreement about what 'equality of opportunity' actually means, and whether it is really an important goal. 

You can read more about the course on the webpage. 

However, I thought I would share some useful background materials for those who might want to explore further, either in advance of taking the course or if you miss the course and want to investigate the topic. 

Online lectures

A good place to start with political philosophy is Michael Sandel’s Justice Course. Several lectures are directly relevant to this course topic, such as:

Lecture 14: A Deal Is A Deal  (You Tube direct link) and  Lecture 15: What’s A Fair Start? – Harvard Justice (You Tube link).

Tommie Shelby "Justice and Race" Blavatnik School of Government (2020)

Charles W. Mills "Theorizing Racial Justice" Tanner Lecture on Human Values (2020), or a video of his talk "Racial Equality" UCT (2014)

More advanced are Tim Scanlon's Uehiro Lectures, Oxford (2013). The third is “When Does Equality Matter? (lecture 3 – equality of opportunity)” but lectures one and two are useful and relevant as well.

Janet Radcliffe Richards' Uehiro Lectures, Oxford (2012) are also relevant. Again, the third is particularly relevant, but references arguments introduced in the previous two. 

“When Does Equality Matter? (lecture 3 – equality of opportunity)” but lectures one and two are useful and relevant as well.

Scanlon builds on the work of his teacher John Rawls, and there are lots of lectures and podcasts about the work of Rawls, such as this Bryan Magee Interview with Ronald Dworkin “Rawls vs Nozick” (1978).

For podcasts, there is the 

• Philosophy Bites episode "Jo Wolff on Rawls" (Also copied into a You Tube video) 
• Talking Politics: History of ideas episode “Rawls on Justice” (2020). 

Podcasts

The BBC Reith Lecture series by Kwame Anthony Appiah (2016) is worth a listen. 

“Discrimination is Expensive” The Pie (2021)

Policy Matters “Discrimination in the labour market and what policymakers can do about it” University of Bath (2021)

Interview with Tarun Khaitan "Indirect Discrimination" Philosophy 247 

"Episode 9 - Understanding indirect discrimination" Mills & Reeve - Employment law Podcast (2017)

The Libertarian Podcast “Anti-Discrimination Laws Vs. Freedom of Association” Hoover Institution (2021)

Course books

The course does not have a single textbook, and those on the course will be provided with selected readings from several sources.

However, if you wanted to purchase a book for use alongside the course then you could go for one of the following, depending which of the three related topics you are particularly interested in:

• Equality of opportunity, in which case you could buy Andrew Mason’s book “Levelling the playing field”
• Discrimination, in which case you could buy Deborah Hellman’s “When is discrimination wrong?”
• Affirmative action, in which case you could get either Cahn’s “The Affirmative Action Debate” or Cohen and Sterba’s “Affirmative Action and Racial Preferences: A Debate (Point/Counterpoint)” or Elizabeth Anderson's "The Imperative of Integration" (2011)

Meritocracy

The course does not focus on the issue of meritocracy, but it is certainly a relevant approach, and one that has been much discussed in recent times. 

Sandel, mentioned above, has recently published a book The Tyranny of Merit and. 

A few other recent books are available free to download:

• Littler, J. Against Meritocracy (2017) is available to download for free. 
• Mulligan, T. Justice and the meritocratic state (Taylor & Francis, 2018). Book available to download as it is Open Access. 

Happy reading, watching and listening and I hope to see you on the course!

Philosophers utilising hours

Sometimes I notice political philosophers mentioning things like hourly pay that play a prominent role in my hourly averaging proposal.

I thought it might be useful to list these. Perhaps I should make a similar list regarding economics too.

Rawls and Pogge

Reading Thomas Pogge's Realizing Rawls (1989) prompted this blog. He mentions leisure as a good at several points in the book. I particularly noted the following table, which considers economic systems with different hourly tax rates to illustrate his discussion of Rawls' difference principle.

Pogge here considers how many hours people with different hourly incomes would work if they faced different levels of tax.

Rawls himself discussed leisure-time after being challenged by economists. He then added leisure-time to his index of primary goods. In Justice as Fairness Rawls notes that leisure-time can be added to the index of goods much more readily than native endowments and states of consciousness. He writes (p179) that "leisure-time has a reasonably objective measure and is open to view."

Pogge (1989, p198-9) writes "the index must also include leisure time as a distinct social primary good...Leisure time must play a role in interpersonal comparisons through which the least advantaged within an existing social system are identified. Even though their annual or lifetime income is rather low, those who choose to do only a few hours of well-paid work each week cannot plausibly be considered less advantaged than others who work many more hours per week in a lower-paying job."

Marxist economics

Marx developed a theory of surplus labour value from the pre-existing labour theory of economic value. Time spent working has a key place in this theory, since workers effectively have part of their working time stolen from them each day by their employer.

I'm not convinced by theories of economic value of this kind, and Marx's position isn't really the type of thing I'm interested in here. Nevertheless, I felt it should be mentioned that hours and working time do play some role in this approach as they have historically pushed activists to consider the issue. 

The Distribution of Time 

Other authors have considered how to conceptualise the distribution of time in society. Bob Goodin's Discretionary Time and Julie Rose's Free Time consider whether people have insufficient time available to them; time in which people have autonomy or over which they have freedom.

People's wage rate will influence how much free time they have. Hourly wage rate plays a part in determining someone's dicretionary time (Discretionary Time p43-5) and their free time (Free Time p40). One of Rose's illustrations contrasts people with differing hourly rates, and the difference this creates between them.

The focus of these works is different, but within the realm of work, different hourly wages will make a difference to the time they have available.

Endowment, Talent and Economic Rent

Other authors mention hours worked and hourly income when discussing the ideal form of tax or income.

Socialist philosopher G.A "Gerry" Cohen, for instance, argues that people should be paid the same per hour, unless they have a particularly onerous job. He says as much in Why Not Socialism? (around page 19-20). He writes that "under socialist equality of opportunity income differences obtain when they reflect nothing but different individual preferences, including income/leisure preferences. People differ in their tastes, not only across consumer items, but also between working only a few hours and consuming rather little on the one hand, and working long hours and consuming rather more on the other. Preferences across income and leisure are not in principle different from preferences across apples and oranges." So /leisure/work choices can lead to different levels of consumption even in a socialist utopia.

Stuart White in his book The Civic Minimum (p79-83) considers people's responsibilities to contribute to society in accordance with his "egalitarian earnings subsidy scheme." This determines people's pay with regard to their endowment, but also the number of hours they work. The approach is designed to get around some of the most troubling aspects of endowment taxation, and while it gets around the worst aspects of endowment taxes, it does not get around all of them. While White presents his subsidy as applying for each pound the person earns, my proposal is to apply the subsidy for each hour the person works (if their lifetime average is low).

Kristi Olson's paper "The Endowment Tax Puzzle" advocates a tax on economic rents and uses hourly income to illustrate the various cases she considers. Olsen argues that both endowment taxes and earnings taxes fail to distinguish between income based on economic rents to talent and earnings from other sources.

I believe my hourly averaging scheme gets closest to capturing the rents obtained by high earners, without requiring knowledge of people's endowments and setting of tax-rates accordingly.

Olson writes (p270) "Part of this problem could be alleviated simply by altering the current tax system to take into account not only the individual’s total earnings, but also the individual’s hourly earnings, such that individuals with lower hourly earnings would be taxed at a lower rate." 

Essentially, Hourly Averaging offers a way to put these suggestions into practice as well as can be without taking account of endowment (which could lead to a "slavery of the talented").

Conclusion

I have argued that hourly averaging is attractive from a broad egalitarian perspective, as an attractive hypothetical insurance choice, and that it can be appealing to non-egalitarians too.

Perhaps if the above authors had known of my proposal they could have invoked it as a close approximation of their own ideal.

It is also worth mentioning that the thinkers above mostly do not advocate a Universal Basic Income, but rather argue that income should track, however indirectly, the number of hours someone works.

Preface for a book I might never write

Preface for a book I might never write: Arguing for the CLIPH-rate tax

Lately I’ve been teaching or planning courses about distributive justice and I’ve mapped out a book I’d love to write if I had the time. It's probably about third on my list of projects though I sometimes mentally change the order of priority.

In fact, I wouldn't be starting from scratch. As well as having taught some of the theories, I could use a couple of pieces I’ve published, and I have written some blogs on the topic too. However, I thought it might be nice to note down the idea here, just as no doubt countless authors have written a preface but never completed the actual book.

The basic idea is to write a three-part (or even volume!) work presenting the argument(s) for my CLIPH-rate tax system from three different theories of justice; Egalitarianism, Consequentialism and desert theory.

Egalitarianism

The egalitarian argument is the easiest one to reproduce as I’ve already written a couple of pieces about this, in an edited collection and in my article “Arguing for hourly averaging.” Resource egalitarianism is the theory of distributive justice I find most compelling, and so this has been my primary concern up until now.

However, not everyone is convinced by egalitarianism and I think that it is possible to make strong arguments for the CLIPH-rate tax from two other theories.

Consequentialism and prioritarianism

Consequentialists about distributive justice believe that the economy should be designed to bring about the best total consequences. The good consequences could be subjective welfare, preference satisfaction, freedoms or some mixture of goods. Consequentialism is a totalising theory; bring about the most good. It therefore doesn’t matter how the goods and bads of society are distributed. Someone might be very badly off both absolutely and relatively under a consequentialist system and they would have no grounds for complaint (except by rejecting consequentialism). For many people, this is enough to reject consequentialism; everyone is just a means to bring about the best total consequences.

In fact, consequentialism does not have to ignore distributive matters entirely. Prioritarianism is a consequentialist theory which gives priority to those who are worse-off when undertaking the consequentialist calculation. The weighting towards the worse-off could vary; with greater emphasis on maximising the total amount of good or with greater priority given to those who have less. Prioritarianism seems to make consequentialism a lot more acceptable, though it doesn’t fully resolve all concerns about it.

How can you argue for the CLIPH-rate tax along consequentialist or prioritarian lines? I’ve made some points in previous blogs and in my book about the ways that an economy with the CLIPH-rate tax at its heart would combine incentives to work, save and invest with a great deal of redistribution to assist those on low incomes. Consequentialists, and particularly prioritarians, would want to ensure that there isn’t an impoverished class of workers at “the bottom” of society. Raising the standard of those who are badly off should bring about better total (let alone prioritised) consequences if we accept that nearly everyone gets declining marginal utility from resources. A poor person will get more utility (or whatever other good you specify) from a £10 gift than a rich person would. A successful economy should therefore focuses on making the worse off as well as possible, where this can be done without damaging overall economic productivity too much.

I would like to do more to show that the CLIPH-rate tax can both help to enlarge the pie while ensuring that everyone gets a decent slice. Hour credits are a key part of the tax calculation, and the only thing that someone can do (by choice) to get more hour credits is to undertake more work. The incentive to work is therefore built into the system. Meanwhile the tax calculation should generate as much taxation from unearned income as possible, representing the ideal form of taxation.

This is because the CLIPH-rate tax should do a good job of taxing not just unearned income but, relatedly, all forms of economic rent. Economic rents accrue to someone when they get more than they need in order to make the economic transaction in question. So if a landlord is considering renting a room and would accept £100 for it, but can get £200 due to high demand, then fully half of the rental income they get is economic rent. If this landlord has a tax rate of 50% they would still rent out their room, but instead of their getting the economic rent, it would go to the government. This revenue can be used to assist the less fortunate members of society, increasing their happiness.

That is a summary of the theory anyway, and I’d like to have more to back up my claims. It would be great to work with economists to help make the case.

Desert theories

I also think that a very strong case can be made for the CLIPH-rate tax from the perspective of desert theory. In a CLIPH-rate tax economy people get more income if they either get more hour credits (more hours worked) or have a higher income. Income made from working will therefore generate much more of a reward than unearned income, something which chimes well with desert theory.

Desert theories aren’t particularly popular with political philosophers, though they seem to be more popular with the general public, who often talk about particular people getting more or less than they deserve. A dodgy banker, crook or tabloid “benefit/welfare queen” could be said to have much more than they deserve. On the other hand, people might claim that nurses, kindly and charitable soul, or other hard-working person get less than they should.

Philosophers have delineated a few different bases for these desert claims. One is that some are more productive than others and should be rewarded accordingly. This is the productive contribution desert base associated with David Miller, Jonathan Riley and Gregory Mankiw.

A second desert base holds that people who do more burdensome jobs should get more than others. This is the compensation for burdensomeness desert base associated with Julian Lamont.  According to this theory, the person who does dangerous or unpleasant work deserves more than others who have less burdensome jobs. Someone working very hard in the cold on a North-sea oil rig with a high risk of death deserves much more than someone who works in a comfortable office.

The third desert base has features from the two above and attempts to get around the problems they have. This is that people who put in more effort should get more than others. This view is associated with George Sher, Wojciech Sadurski and Heather Milne. There are issues with all three desert bases though they all have some intuitive appeal. One is the extent they link to what people earn on the labour market.

I believe there is strong case to be made that the CLIPH-rate tax does a very good job of tracking these desert bases. Under a CLIPH-rate tax system people will get more if they get more hour credits (work longer hours) or if they have a higher income, and particularly if they do both these by working longer hours for higher pay. This seems to track all the desert bases above, since market pay rates reward productivity, burdensomeness and effort, and the hourly element also represents a productive contribution, the burden of giving up one’s time and an effort. Meanwhile, people who receive mostly unearned income from gifts or economic rents will be taxed very highly.

Other theories

I don’t think that there is much traction in arguing for the CLIPH-rate tax from libertarianism, though perhaps it might work from a few of the less common versions of left-libertarianism. Nevertheless, it would be a stretch and I don’t find libertarianism compelling anyway so I can live without trying to make that argument.

Sufficientarianism is another theory that is plausible. While I’m sure it’s possible to make an argument from sufficientarianism I’m not sure whether it is worth attempting it. After all, there are lots of forms of sufficientarianism and many people advocate a pluralist theory anyway (sufficientarianism + some other theory). Plus I don’t see why the CLIPH-rate tax particularly does any better at getting people above thresholds except perhaps for the consequentialist/prioritarian reasons set out above. Let me know if you disagree and think I should write about this.

Prospects and next steps

What are the prospects for ever writing this book? We’ll see. I might be able to do it fairly quickly if I could devote a chunk of time to it, but other things always seem more pressing. Perhaps I can start with a few journal articles and see if anything develops from there. Maybe this is as far as it will get? If so, its nice to have a record at least.

And if anyone has any suggestions or wants to collaborate do drop me an email.