"Tax Freedom Day" is complete nonsense

Apparently the Free Marketeers have declared today (June 18th) to be "Tax Freedom Day" in the UK.

The idea that people have been working for the government up to this point is really powerful - the nonsense of it all got me thinking of a completely different way of approaching taxation. 

Why not think of a "Tax Freedom minute" within the hour? This led me to develop my hourly averaging proposal, explained in my book Rethinking Taxation. 

Calculating "Tax Freedom"

If you do want to work out how much of your time goes to the government/society and how you get for yourself, then it would not just be be very difficult to do, it would actually be impossible. 

Think about it: 

• How much does anyone "contribute" to society? 
• How much does anyone "benefit" from society? 

If you want to use market prices for one you'd have to do so for the other as well. What is the value of the resources that each person receives over their life, from their families, government, employers and investment gains? I'll come back to this. 

When it comes to contribution things are even harder. 

• Someone who follows the law (and its spirit) is contributing to society, while someone who doesn't is not. 
• Someone who tends their garden thoughtfully and picks up litter benefits others, someone who litters and pollutes egregiously detracts.

How can you put a number on all these forms of contribution? 

Nagel and Murphy in their book The Myth of Ownership, showed this this whole line of thought is based on a simplistic everyday libertarianism. We assume that our gross income is in some sense ours as if we live in an imaginary libertarian economy. 

But we don't live in that economy. We live in our economy, in the real world. 

Tax isn't the only kind of contribution. However, it is an important one and everyone should be happy to pay their taxes out of a sense of reciprocity. 

Benefits received 

Of course, as I indicated earlier, what this "calculation" also misses is that we all benefit from government spending, past and present.

The government provides all sorts of goods and services that benefit us all. 

Some people, as is right, get more from the government than they put in. 

Children aren't going to be contributing, but all being well they will grow up and contribute later on. 

Some older people might not be contributing, but they will have done earlier in life.

If this was an honest exercise it would attempt to account for all the benefits that people receive over their life. 

It isn't an honest exercise, it is just libertarian propaganda that makes no sense. 

Net contributions?

Even if you think it is possible to calculate someone's tax contribution, and that it would be meaningful (which it isn't), the number would vary hugely from person to person.

Some people will get more than they contribute in ways that are right. We should want proper systems in place to support the vulnerable in society and not just abandon them.

Is it forgivable to spread nonsense?

You can criticize the supporters of "Tax Freedom Day" for being selfish, which is probably right. 

Or you can criticize them for being unrealistic ideologues, which is fair. 

But most importantly, they are also just talking nonsense in thinking that the numbers are in any sense meaningful.

People have got a right to be selfish, they have a right to believe and propagate nonsense.

It is a free country after all. 

The rest of us have a duty to see through it all. 

Book Review: Political Philosophy and Taxation

I was pleased to be asked to review a book on Political Philosophy and Taxation for the British Tax Review, and I wanted to provide the text here on my blog for the benefit of those who do not have access to the journal. 

Legal disclaimer: This material is (a slightly edited version of) the review first published by Thomson Reuters, trading as Sweet & Maxwell, 5 Canada Square, Canary Wharf, London, E14 5AQ. It was published in the British Tax Review as "Political Philosophy and Taxation (Springer, 2022), by Robert van Brederode (ed.) (2022, 5, pp662-5)" and is reproduced by agreement with the publishers. 

Review of Political Philosophy and Taxation, by Robert van Brederode (ed.) (Springer, 2022)

As someone who teaches an introductory course on political philosophy, I was pleased to be asked to review this work,  which really is—as it claims—the first book providing a comprehensive overview of political philosophy and taxation. The textbook for the course I teach (Wolff, 2015) begins with the suggestion that political philosophy might be about “Who gets what?” and “Says who?”  Put like this, the link between political philosophy and taxation is abundantly clear. 

There are, no doubt, many ways to structure such a book. It could be organised by topic like the abovementioned textbook, which covers the key topics of:

1) The nature and justification of the state.

2) Who should rule? Should we have democracy, and if so what kind?

3) Liberty and rights.

4) The distribution of property.

5) Justice for everyone, everywhere? (On whether Western political philosophy has ignored or excluded any important groups or perspectives.) 

Again, all of these topics are relevant to taxation, particularly property and distributive justice. However, unlike the above textbook, this book is organised around different schools of thought within the Western tradition. The subtitle of the book describes it as a history of political philosophy. The book does indeed provide a detailed intellectual history of several influential schools of (Western) thought on the topic, explaining how key thinkers from those schools approached the topic of taxation, situated within their wider philosophical projects. This is a sensible move. Experts in different schools of thought can then take turns in summarising each, indicating where key thinkers have said anything relating to taxation. 

One question this raises is whether the book is an exercise in intellectual history or directly one of the philosophies and their implications. The first and last chapters by the book’s editor are certainly not intellectual history, but rather direct interventions in debates. The other chapters tended to fit the historical brief more closely, reporting on the relations between various thinkers and their views of taxation.  Two, acknowledged, exceptions were Chapter 8 on legal positivism and the final chapter (11) where the editor provides his own proposal for radical tax reform. There is a good case for organising the book by historical school, though that places additional pressure on the introductory chapter, a point to which I will return. 

Interestingly, most of the authors are not obviously primarily political philosophers, given their departmental affiliations. However, they all clearly know their respective schools of thought very well indeed, often because they use them in their own research on taxation. Certainly, taxation is inevitably a multidisciplinary topic, hence the need for all who write about it to have a good understanding of political philosophy. 

Which “schools of thought” should be included in such a book? The book contains a lot of the ones I would expect, but I found some of the choices surprising. One thing to make readers aware of is that the book leans libertarian, which is clearly the editor’s own approach given the chapters he has authored (the first and last). Perhaps that is a perk of being the editor, but I think it should have been made clearer at the outset, or, perhaps even better to avoid these strong interventions given that they did not fit with the stated brief of the book. 

There are several chapters that are more left-leaning (on socialism, egalitarianism and feminism), so the book still provides a good overview of most of the relevant views of taxation. However, questions can be raised as to whether there was a need for chapters on conservatism, classical liberalism and libertarianism, plus the two non-historical chapters, given the overlap between them. 

I think that the libertarian leanings of the book could give a false impression of the way that contemporary political philosophers would approach taxation. I undertook a poll of 78 philosophers on the topic and one third approached the topic in a liberal egalitarian way (including myself). Thirty per cent took a socialist approach and about 15 per cent consequentialist, most of whom selected “centrist or progressive” rather than classical liberal.  Seventy per cent of responses indicated that liberal egalitarianism represented the dominant approach. A lot of the debates within this school were mentioned in the introduction but not actually presented in the book (except in passing). (For more on the literature see Pedersen) 

There would have been a case for a chapter on luck egalitarianism, and indeed Ronald Dworkin (2006) has an entire chapter on tax justice in a book which was not referenced at all.  

Another omission I thought was discussion of Aristotelian-inspired views (perhaps other than in the chapter on conservativism), which are particularly to be found in theories of desert, participatory democracy and communitarianism. Natural desert is a distributive theory, a rival to Nozickean libertarianism, utilitarianism and the various forms of egalitarianism (see Campbell, Miller). Desert theory is not at all popular with political philosophers—it had no advocates in my poll.  However, there is an argument that desert is the common approach of the public (see Shiffrin).  There was a section on desert in the introduction, but this was a very misleading discussion, presented as an attack on luck egalitarianism, a view which is neither desertist nor—we recall—represented in the book. 

Desert might also be relevant to those who believe that political decisions should be made democratically as a representation of the views of the common good, or as an expression of their views or values. Communitarianism was mentioned as an example of a view opposed to libertarianism in the introduction  but not again in the book. The final chapter did have “Democracy” in the title, but this did not present a history of the arguments for and against democracy, which go back to Plato’s Republic, but was in fact highly opposed to democracy. Agreeing with anti-democratic libertarians that “an electorate that is uninformed, underinformed, or misinformed”  will mean that majority rule “opens the door for the misuse of power to the detriment to the interests of others”.  “Majority democracy violates the principle of equality as it is based on coercion of the many”,  which apparently means that a decision by the majority to impose taxation would violate the “principle of liberty”.  These apparently inviolable principles are neither explained nor referenced.

Philosophy of colonialisation and race is another possible approach that could have been included, though this has methodological affinities with feminism and intersectionality as mentioned in the chapter on feminism. The historical-school approach taken also creates the problem that important contemporary debates are omitted, about global justice for instance. 

Most of my criticisms are of the introduction, as I’ve hinted above, which represents a missed opportunity. The first words of the introduction are “liberal individualism” but what is this and why start with it? Perhaps because methodological individualism was the starting point of Hobbes’ political thought, which later begat liberalism (though Hobbes was no liberal). If the book is written for newcomers to political philosophy it should have explained what that subject is, perhaps mentioning disagreements over method, such as whether liberal individualism is the right approach. Another important thing to cover is to explain the philosophical topics and disputes that bear on taxation, and perhaps to explain some common terminology. These are mentioned, but too obliquely for the complete novice who knows little about the subject. 

The introduction is very long, but far too much of it is spent attacking views that will be presented later in the book. There are seven pages criticising Murphy and Nagel (2002) on “everyday libertarianism,” even though their argument is presented in three pages near the end of Chapter 9 (pp.335–338).  I can understand that their arguments should be presented, since they are very important. However, the introductory chapter should really ease newcomers into the discipline, not simply attack the dominant views. 

The introduction began and ended with a key point that I would expect to find; why have a book on political philosophy and taxation? Some good points were made here, but more could have been added. The book is quite advanced, but it should be useful for graduate students and academics whose work relates to taxation. Tax practitioners may also benefit from considering political philosophy, though they might need to read an introductory text first. However, political philosophers too could be interested in reviewing what different schools of thought have to say about taxation. Those looking to write about tax will also benefit from having the dispersed writings of thinkers compiled together in one volume. 

Overall, as a political philosopher with a focus on taxation, there was little difficulty in selling the importance of a book with the title Political Philosophy and Taxation on me. The chapters were capably written by experts, and I learned a lot from it. Indeed, I found myself wishing that this very useful resource was available when I began my PhD on the topic nearly 15 years ago. 

References:

Campbell, T. (2002). Justice. Palgrave.

Dworkin, R. (2006). Is Democracy Possible Here? Princeton University Press.

Miller, D. (1999). Principles of social justice. Harvard University Press.

Murphy, L., & Nagel, T. (2002). The Myth of Ownership: Taxes and Justice. OUP.

Pedersen, J. (2020). Distributive justice and taxation. Routledge.

Sheffrin, S. M. (2013). Tax fairness and folk justice. Cambridge University Press.

Wolff, J. (2015). An introduction to political philosophy. OUP. 

Equality of Opportunity and Discrimination Materials

This coming term I will be teaching a new course for the general public on some overlapping issues relating to justice that I thought would work well together. 

The online course Equality of Opportunity and the Ethics of Discrimination covers some lingering issues of controversy about how society should respond to unequal opportunity. There is even disagreement about what 'equality of opportunity' actually means, and whether it is really an important goal. 

You can read more about the course on the webpage. 

However, I thought I would share some useful background materials for those who might want to explore further, either in advance of taking the course or if you miss the course and want to investigate the topic. 

Online lectures

A good place to start with political philosophy is Michael Sandel’s Justice Course. Several lectures are directly relevant to this course topic, such as:

Lecture 14: A Deal Is A Deal  (You Tube direct link) and  Lecture 15: What’s A Fair Start? – Harvard Justice (You Tube link).

Tommie Shelby "Justice and Race" Blavatnik School of Government (2020)

Charles W. Mills "Theorizing Racial Justice" Tanner Lecture on Human Values (2020), or a video of his talk "Racial Equality" UCT (2014)

More advanced are Tim Scanlon's Uehiro Lectures, Oxford (2013). The third is “When Does Equality Matter? (lecture 3 – equality of opportunity)” but lectures one and two are useful and relevant as well.

Janet Radcliffe Richards' Uehiro Lectures, Oxford (2012) are also relevant. Again, the third is particularly relevant, but references arguments introduced in the previous two. 

“When Does Equality Matter? (lecture 3 – equality of opportunity)” but lectures one and two are useful and relevant as well.

Scanlon builds on the work of his teacher John Rawls, and there are lots of lectures and podcasts about the work of Rawls, such as this Bryan Magee Interview with Ronald Dworkin “Rawls vs Nozick” (1978).

For podcasts, there is the 

• Philosophy Bites episode "Jo Wolff on Rawls" (Also copied into a You Tube video) 
• Talking Politics: History of ideas episode “Rawls on Justice” (2020). 

Podcasts

The BBC Reith Lecture series by Kwame Anthony Appiah (2016) is worth a listen. 

“Discrimination is Expensive” The Pie (2021)

Policy Matters “Discrimination in the labour market and what policymakers can do about it” University of Bath (2021)

Interview with Tarun Khaitan "Indirect Discrimination" Philosophy 247 

"Episode 9 - Understanding indirect discrimination" Mills & Reeve - Employment law Podcast (2017)

The Libertarian Podcast “Anti-Discrimination Laws Vs. Freedom of Association” Hoover Institution (2021)

Course books

The course does not have a single textbook, and those on the course will be provided with selected readings from several sources.

However, if you wanted to purchase a book for use alongside the course then you could go for one of the following, depending which of the three related topics you are particularly interested in:

• Equality of opportunity, in which case you could buy Andrew Mason’s book “Levelling the playing field”
• Discrimination, in which case you could buy Deborah Hellman’s “When is discrimination wrong?”
• Affirmative action, in which case you could get either Cahn’s “The Affirmative Action Debate” or Cohen and Sterba’s “Affirmative Action and Racial Preferences: A Debate (Point/Counterpoint)” or Elizabeth Anderson's "The Imperative of Integration" (2011)

Meritocracy

The course does not focus on the issue of meritocracy, but it is certainly a relevant approach, and one that has been much discussed in recent times. 

Sandel, mentioned above, has recently published a book The Tyranny of Merit and. 

A few other recent books are available free to download:

• Littler, J. Against Meritocracy (2017) is available to download for free. 
• Mulligan, T. Justice and the meritocratic state (Taylor & Francis, 2018). Book available to download as it is Open Access. 

Happy reading, watching and listening and I hope to see you on the course!

One rule for the rich...

A recent Washington Post piece by Elizabeth Breunig raises a lot of interesting points and is worth reading.

 

She highlights that in the US (as in the UK) there are constant moves to ensure that those receiving ever shrinking welfare payments are in fact working (or actively seeking work). This is sometimes referred to as 'workfare' 

Breunig points out that most of the non-working poor are elderly, children, or care-givers, all of whom seem to have some reason for not earning more in market employment.

What is particularly interesting about this piece is comparison between the treatment of the poor and rich non-workers.

Everyday libertarianism for the idle rich vs. workfare for the undeserving poor

This comparison might strike some as odd - the poor in question are receiving assistance from society via government spending while the idle rich in question aren't. They receive their money from dividends etc.

The author gives examples of policies that benefit investors and capital-holders, which could be considered subsidies for the idle rich. The point is that these subsidies do not come with a work-requirement as do workfare programmes

I think its possible to go further than this. Even if there weren’t such subsidies it would still be morally acceptable to insist that the idle rich work, even if their income comes from a “private” rather than a “public” source.

This is because the idea that there is a difference between the two is based upon a mistake, labelled everyday libertarianism by philosophers Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel in their excellent book The Myth of Ownership.

This is the idea that people are led to consider their gross income to be ‘theirs’ and that the tax system takes some of it from them. If you are a libertarian, then you might believe this to be the case. However, since libertarianism isn’t a very attractive political philosophy and since most people aren’t in fact libertarians it is an unfortunate but common mistake to make.  

It is more appropriate to consider the property distribution system holistically, and consider each owner (individual, corporation, charity or government) as the temporary holder of their property. There are strong reasons to let the owner have power of the property while they own it, of course, and I don’t draw the conclusion that the government should be able to seize property unless there is an exceptional circumstance (such as a national emergency, where the property is required for infrastructure development or where the property in question is illegal). I don’t go as far as more radical leftists who would then say that the above means that any private property can be seized by the government at any time.

The point is that when property is transferred from one owner to another it is an opportunity for society to consider whether to (in rare situations) block or (more commonly) tax the transaction. It may appear as if the transaction is just between the two parties involved, but in fact the whole of society is involved. Firstly, society supports the system in which the property and the transaction exists. Secondly, the value of the property exists because of the rest of society.

Investors aren’t just sitting on their property, they are sending it out into the world and getting more back. This is captured by my Comprehensive-Acquired-income tax-base. A self-sufficient farmer who tends their own land and gains from it wouldn’t have to pay tax on their gains. But no-one gets rich from being a self-sufficient farmer who does not engage economically with anyone else.

The idle rich person is then a recipient of social wealth in just the same way as the welfare/benefit recipient.

Why do we care whether people work?

There are lots of possible reasons why we might want to ensure that people work rather than receive money while being idle.

·       Social Consequences: If someone who could work doesn’t do so then this is a missed opportunity for society. Society could have got the benefit of this labour but misses out.

·       Paternalistic consequentialist: This is the idea that it is in people’s interest to work (whether they realise or not). This is because people who are idle will get into unhealthy habits, become slothful, lose purpose and so on.

·       Contributions are important: It is important for people (where able) to contribute to society, and people should only receive social wealth to the extent that they do contribute to society. Interestingly, desert-based (or meritocratic) theories of justice would be against all unearned wealth such as gifts and inheritances since these are unearned.

What is interesting is that these three justifications apply to the wealthy just as much as the poor.

An alternative justification is that people should do whatever they are required to do by the correct theory of justice. Some of those theories will require workfare, and they may or may not require wealthy individuals to work too. My preferred theory would require both. This is the correct way to think about it, and I encourage people to engage with such theories.

However, what about those who want to support workfare but not force the idle rich to work before they can receive unearned income?

To be consistent, anyone relying on any of the three arguments listed above also will have to apply this to wealthy individuals who choose not to work.

What is a contribution?

In the article, Breunig makes the point that carers can contribute to society without receiving market income. Furthermore, many clearly socially useful activities aren’t well-rewarded in the market (such as most minimum wage work), while some activities that aren’t as clearly socially useful are well-remunerated. This is because remuneration follows from supply as well as demand.

On the other hand, someone who inherits a fortune and lives off the returns from this obtains a market income without contributing. It would be possible to insist that only those who work should be able to receive unearned income, or that lifetime unearned income should be linked to the amount of work someone has performed.

Market income is not a perfect indicator of contribution. However, again, I don’t take the hard-left conclusion that market income is meaningless.

Nevertheless, there is often some correlation between market income and social contribution, something I mentioned in my blogs on desert-theories of justice. The point is that we can look at a broad conception of contribution as participation in the labour market or undertaking some socially useful activity such as studying or caring.

Workfare for the rich?

So, do we need to insist on workfare for rich investors as well as the poor?

I think so, on the basis that this would make for a fairer society. My CLIPH-rate tax system would link people’s net income to the hours they have worked (or undertaken some equivalent or having been excused from doing so).

However, those who argue for workfare on more limited grounds, such as the three arguments listed above, should also support workfare for the idle rich on the same grounds. This would presumably mean taxing non-working but able people from gaining unearned income through punitive taxation or by blocking such benefits until the individual has undertaken the requisite about of work.

How else could they avoid the inconsistency?

·       They could stop insisting on workfare and instead support a Universal Basic Income, i.e. to give up on workfare.

·       They could advocate a theory of justice which justifies workfare programmes for the poor but not the rich. This rules-out desert or contribution-based theories. Furthermore, it probably also rules-out consequentialist theories which emphasise economically strong outcomes.

As I mentioned, my proposal is to link net income and work for all those who can work. This applies whether they are wealthy or poor, high-earner or low-earner. 

What is wrong with capitalism?

Some people think capitalism is a terrible evil that must be fought and destroyed. At the other extreme there are those who think that laissez-faire capitalism is the perfect economic system. I think both of these views are hugely mistaken but that the question what is wrong with capitalism is still an important one.

Anti-capitalists think that capitalism is wrong in itself for at least one of two reasons. One is that an alternative system would enable people to become more than they can be under capitalism. The second is that these alternatives could avoid terrible things like exploitation or alienation that are inherent to capitalism. At the other extreme some Libertarians (particularly Randian objectivists) think that laissez-faire capitalism produces the right distribution of goods in society and governments that interfere with the market more than necessary are exploiting those who are required to pay taxes or the costs of regulation.

I am not unusual in thinking both of these views are wrong-headed. But it is interesting to consider how you can argue the inherent rightness or wrongness of an economic system. After all an economic system is not an agent that can be held responsible for what it does—it is what is collectively brought into effect and enforced by our society.

Presumably an argument for or against a type of economic system will have to be teleological. An economic system has a particular purpose and if it does not or cannot achieve that purpose then it is wrong. My (uncontroversial) view is that the purpose of an economic system is to provide people with the stuff that they need and want for themselves and those who depend upon them in a way that is fair to all members of society. In follow-up blogs I will consider somealternative purposes for economic systems and some further arguments against markets.

Capitalist systems do a good job of achieving the above ends because:

1.       They provide people with incentives to work and invest in activities that will produce things that others want.

2.       They allow the transmission of information via prices without the need for any direct oversight.

If we are judging economic systems as I propose above then it is impossible to take the extreme pro- and anti- capitalist positions above. There are innumerable variations on capitalist systems and these should all be judged against any reasonable alternative when choosing which economic system (or range of systems) to support. As a liberal political philosopher I obviously think that we need to adopt the best available theory of distributive justice to decide. But what if we just think in terms of economic systems in general?

Given the position I take above, we should not ignore the consequentialist libertarian (think F.A. Hayek or Milton Friedman) arguments for leaving markets to do their work. In one sense the market is a bottom-up one in the way that left-wing anarchists claim of their proposals. However, instead of people voting to come up with a single communal position on everything under capitalism people vote with their money for what will be produced.

However, the libertarian (dis)utopia provides a good warning against following this market logic too far. Capitalism will tend towards inequality and monopoly, something which 19^th century left-wingers thought obvious from observing their societies and which some researchers such as Thomas Piketty and Tony Atkinson have been attempting to prove more recently. Following the money-voting analogy above you have a system of voting where some people are born with the chance to have a lot more votes than others.

There is an overwhelming case for creating a form of capitalism that is regulated to stop people being in a position to take advantage of one another and to ensure that the benefits of the capitalist system are shared among all those in society and not just a fortunate few. Ideally, people would have the opportunity to obtain a reasonably similar amount of money ‘votes’ over what is produced in society and how much of it they get compared with others.

The position I take above is fairly standard, but I wanted to link it to my tax and benefit reform proposals. The aim of my CLIPH-rate tax proposal is to allow capitalism to do its job in the production of goods while interfering with it in the (mal)distribution of goods.

This is done by taxing those who receive large amounts of income or wealth without having to work for it at the highest possible rates and to provide the maximum possible support those who work long hours at low wages, all while maintaining (or replacing) incentives to work that capitalism provides.

The laissez-faire capitalist state is productive because the poor have to work long and hard to avoid destitution while the rich are encouraged to invest and work long and hard by the huge financial incentives offered to them.

My proposal is to link people’s lifetime income to the amount of hours they have been credited for working (or been excused from working). This means that people will all start from a much more equal economic position (since they cannot benefit heavily from gifts early on in their lives but only over time as they gain more hour credits). It also provides a method to bring closer together the incomes of those who do very well and those who do less well in the economy.

Everyone is in the same economic class as all need hour credits in order to gain an income, and there are strong work incentives. Individuals will benefit from earning more money as they do under all capitalistic systems but they also benefit from working longer and gaining more hour credits. The rich and talented cannot hold the rest to ransom by claiming they will withhold their labour or investments if they are not provided with immense riches in return.

While individuals have their prospects drawn closer together the productive system can be perfectly ruthless. Companies will need to be competitive and innovative in order to survive and succeed and those which do not will face bankruptcy or take-over. There is no need to weep for companies which go bankrupt as these are not persons in any moral sense (though we might feel sorry for investors and workers who lose out having been duped by criminal executives).

The idea behind my CLIPH-rate tax and hourly averaging proposals is to take the best of capitalism while mitigating against the worst in capitalism, thereby creating the best available economic system.